Publications

Please feel free to contact me for papers behind a paywall.

  • (forthcoming) Fittingness First?: Reasons to Withhold Belief, Philosophical Studies. | Link (penultimate draft)
  • (forthcoming) Belief and Settledness, Inquiry. | Link 
  • (2022) The Real Myth of Coherence, Erkenntnis, 87(3), 1211-1230.  | Link (open access)
  • (2021) The Independence of (In)coherence, Synthese, 199(3-4), 6563-6584. | Link (open access)​
  • (2021) Two Roles for Reasons: Cause for Divorce?, Philosophical Studies, 178(6), 1993-2008. | Link (open access)
  • (2020) Enkratic Rationality Is Instrumental Rationality, Philosophical Perspectives, 34(1), 164-183.  | Link (open access)
  • (2018) Willing the End Means Willing the Means: An Overlooked Reading of Kant, Ergo, 5(16), 419-444. | Link (open access)
  • (2018) Reasoning, Rational Requirements, and Occurrent Attitudes, European Journal of Philosophy, 26(4), 1343-1357. | Link​

Work Under Review

To preserve the anonymity of the peer review process, I have removed the titles of the papers. Please feel free to contact me if you are interested in any of the papers.
​
  • A paper on the companions-in-guilt argument in metaethics

Work In Progress

A New Solution to the Preface Paradox
  • A very short abstract: We don't need to give up the requirement of conjunctive closure in the face of the preface paradox, once we recognize that the requirement applies only to (rationally) activated beliefs. (email me for a draft)​

Reasons and Reasoning: An Interpersonal Picture
  • A very short abstract: The idea that reasons are premises of reasoning is vulnerable to counterexamples, but only if the reasoning in question is thought of as a solitary endeavor. Reasons are premises of interpersonal reasoning. (email me for a draft)

What Is Structural Rationality? 
  • A very short abstract: offers a unifying account of structural rationality, critically engaging with both Alex Worsnip's recent account and my previous work  (email me for a draft)

Constitutivism Gone Interpersonal 
  • A very short abstract: Moral norms aren't probably going to be grounded in what is constitutive of (individual) agency, but they could plausibly be grounded in what is constitutive of reasoning on behalf of another (no shareable draft yet, but would be happy to chat about it)